Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market Manipulation by Friedman, Richard D.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1990
Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities
Market Manipulation
Richard D. Friedman
University of Michigan Law School, rdfrdman@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/180
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Friedman, Richard D. "Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market Manipulation." Mich. L. Rev. 89 (1990): 30-68.
STALKING THE SQUEEZE: UNDERSTANDING
COMMODITIES MARKET MANIPULATION
Richard D. Friedman*
Commodities manipulations often have spectacular results. Not
all dramatic upheavals in the commodities markets result from manip-
ulation, however; indeed, sometimes when prices rise sharply the mar-
ket is performing one of its most important functions, cushioning the
impact of external forces that might otherwise have been far more dis-
ruptive.1 Thus, attempting to discern the line between a manipulated
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1973, J.D. 1976, Harvard University; D.
Phil. 1979, Christ Church, Oxford, England. - Ed. My thanks to Charlie Bieneman and Peter
Gold for extremely able research assistance and to George Davidson, Merritt Fox, Jerry Mark-
ham, Fred Schauer, Joel Seligman, and James J. White for helpful comments.
1. A recent episode, out of which litigation is currently pending, illustrates how the same
conduct might be characterized as manipulative or as perfectly proper market behavior. An
Italian firm, Ferruzzi Finanziaria S.p.A, was long about 23 million bushels in the July 1989
soybean contract on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) while less than 13 million bushels were
readily deliverable. The CBOT forced large long traders, including Ferruzzi, to reduce their
positions, resulting in a sharp drop in soybean prices and costing Ferruzzi millions of dollars.
The CBOT has since begun disciplinary proceedings against Ferruzzi on charges that the com-
pany attempted to corner the market. Ferruzzi, however, has asserted that its conduct was en-
tirely legitimate because it was attempting to meet the needs of one of its subsidiaries, a
manufacturer of soybean products; indeed, Ferruzzi has claimed that the CBOT order was itself
a manipulative order to drive prices down, thus favoring six of the CBOT's directors, who held
short positions at the time. See, eg., Markham, The Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices
- The Unprosecutable Crime, 7 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 1990); Ferruzzi Loses Court
Request, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1990, § 1, at 32, col. 4; Greising & Rossant, Why the Pits Are Sick
Over Soybeans, Bus. WK., July 31, 1989, at 76; CBOT Chief Answers to Iowa Soybean Farmers,
Chi. Trib., July 22, 1989, at 1, col. 2; U.S. Agency Forced Ferruzzi to Trim Soybean Holdings,
L.A. Times, July 21, 1989, pt. 4, at 1, col. 2.
The Hunt family of Texas was involved in an earlier alleged squeeze of the CBOT soybean
market, this one involving the May 1977 contract. See Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v.
Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1979). Collectively, the Hunts held a long position 6f about 32.5
million bushels, far more than both the deliverable supply at that time, about 10 million bushels,
and the speculative position limits imposed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC). See Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and Gen. Legislation of the Comm. on Agric., Nutrition,
and Forestry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 216 (1978) (pt. II); Markham, supra. Notwithstanding the
Hunts' protests that they were not acting in unison, they ultimately agreed with the CFTC to pay
$500,000 in civil sanctions - the largest in history - and to abstain from soybean trading for
two years. Hunts Paying Civil Penalties on Soybeans, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1981, at D14, col. 6.
The Hunts were also involved in what is probably the best-known recent case of alleged
manipulation, the silver boom and bust of 1979-1980. The price of silver futures had been rela-
tively stable at about $6 per ounce from 1974 through 1978, but in 1979 began to rise sharply.
The rise accelerated through the last part of the year, and on January 17, 1980 peaked at about
$50 per ounce. Then the tumble began, and by March 17, 1980 the price had fallen back to
$10.80 per ounce. See, eg., Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 693 F. Supp. 58, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Knight
& Rowe, Jr., Hunt Brothers Thrill Ride in Silver Takes U.S. Close to Disaster, Wash. Post, Apr.
17, 1980, at G1. The episode spawned a massive web of litigation, centering on accusations that
the Hunts and others manipulated the silver market. See, e.g., Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCom-
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market and a properly functioning one is perhaps the most important
question in commodities law, and certainly one of the most intriguing.
Congress has been intent on preventing manipulation since the begin-
ning of federal commodities regulation in the 1920s, 2 yet courts, ad-
ministrators, and academic commentators have failed to agree on a
sensible approach to the basic question: What is manipulation?
This article focuses on the most important type of manipulation,
modity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir. 1987). (From 1980 to 1982, I participated ac-
tively in the representation of ContiCommodity Services, Inc., principally in matters arising out
of the silver episode.)
For other incidents in which corners or squeezes were alleged, or in which a market appeared
ripe for such manipulation, see In re Compania Salvadorena De Cafe [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,886 (Oct. 26, 1983) (holding that respondent manipu-
lated the July 1977 coffee futures contract on the New York Coffee and Sugar Futures Ex-
change); H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 71-73 (1982) (noting that four traders
dominated the March 1979 CBOT wheat contract, which traded at an unusual differential to the
May contract, and concluding that these traders could have manipulated the market had they
chosen to but that the evidence of such manipulation "was not very strong"); In re Indiana Farm
Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796 (Dec. 17,
1982) (rejecting allegation of manipulation of the July 1973 CBOT corn contract, notwithstand-
ing extremely steep price rise on the last day of trading); In re Abrams, [1987-1990 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,408 (Feb. 8, 1989) (initial decision) (rejecting allegation
of attempted manipulation of September 1984 frozen orange juice concentrate contract on New
York Cotton Exchange, even though the accused held a dominant long position and placed
"scaled-up orders" to sell well over the market price, because trader, who had anticipated a
shortage, was attempting to make legitimate speculative profits), interlocutory review denied,
[1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,577 (Oct. 13, 1989); Apex Oil Co.
v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1987) (reviewing grant of summary judgment, holding that
evidence was sufficient with respect to certain alleged conspirators, but not with respect to others,
to support a claim of manipulation of the February 1982 heating oil futures contract on the New
York Mercantile Exchange); In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 23,876 (July 15, 1987) (rejecting a claim of manipulation of the May 1971 CBOT wheat con-
tract, notwithstanding dominant position held by respondents and a large price rise on the final
day of trading; shorts held accountable for failure to deliver), revg. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,767 (Jan. 3, 1983).
For a comprehensive survey of manipulation cases, see Markham, supra.
2. The first comprehensive federal regulation of futures trading, the Future Trading Act of
1921, focused on what it deemed excessive speculation, but it also authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to suspend the trading privileges of anyone "attempting to manipulate the market
price of any grain." The Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 66, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187, 189 (1921).
That Act was held unconstitutional in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). It was promptly
replaced, however, by the Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 331, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998, 1000 (1922),
which contained essentially identical substantive terms but relied on the commerce power rather
than the taxing power. In 1936, Congress enlarged the scope of the Act's coverage and renamed
it the Commodity Exchange Act. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 675, ch. 545, 49 Stat.
1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988)). In doing so, Congress for the first
time made it a federal criminal violation to "manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of
any commodity in interstate commerce" or to "corner or attempt to corner any such commod-
ity." Commodity Exchange Act § 116,49 Stat. at 1501 (1936). These prohibitions remain intact
today in the current code, 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1988), and in recent years prevention of manipula-
tion has become perhaps the principal focus of regulatory efforts. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5843, 5861
(Committee on Agriculture and Forestry Report on H.R. 13113) ("The proper regulatory func-
tion of an agency which regulates futures trading is to assure that the market is free of manipula-
tion and other practices which prevent the market from being a true reflection of supply and
demand.").
October 1990]
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and the most intractable to analyze - the squeeze. 3 To get a first
glimpse of the problem, consider the following hypothetical.
A Hypothetical. A Squeeze or Ordinary Trading? Suppose that fu-
tures contracts in stringbeans are traded on the Fictitious National
Stringbean Exchange (FNSE). Like other traditional futures con-
tracts, these are standardized, bilateral executory contracts. 4 They
call for the seller to deliver a standardized quantity of a standardized
type of stringbean at a specified delivery point during a specified
period.
This precision makes liquidity practical. If a buyer and a seller
both want to enter into a contract for June delivery, they need only
bargain over price. Although they make their contract face to face, in
open bidding on the floor of the exchange, they do not have to deal
with each other afterwards. For every long (one who has bought fu-
tures contracts), there is one and only one short (one who has sold).
The exchange's clearinghouse steps between the traders, taking the
short position to every long and the long position to every short. If
3. Some discussions differentiate between a squeeze and a corner, with the distinction being
that the corner, unlike the squeeze, requires domination of the market for the physical commod-
ity. See, eg., T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MAR-
KETS § 12.10 (1983); Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 932 (1972). As used by the Cargill court, the term squeeze refers to any situation in
which "the open interest on the futures market is considerably in excess of the deliverable sup-
plies," and is not necessarily manipulative. 452 F.2d at 1162. The Cargill court reserves the
term "intentional squeeze" for the situation in which a long manipulatively exploits a shortage of
deliverable supplies. 452 F.2d at 1162. As used in this article, the term squeeze indicates an act
of manipulation; a shortage that is neither caused nor exploited manipulatively is not considered
a squeeze. I do not distinguish between a squeeze and a corner, in part because I believe they
represent essentially the same phenomenon. Simplifying somewhat, a long has power to squeeze
the market if his futures position exceeds the deliverable supply in independent hands; it matters
relatively little whether, or to what extent, the low level of independently held supply is explained
by an extensive hoard of the physical commodity in the long's hands or by other causes. Fur-
thermore, even if a squeezer does not begin with a significant holding of the physical commodity,
he will almost always acquire one during the course of his squeeze, because the higher he drives
the price the more the shorts will find it preferable to deliver rather than to liquidate.
This article does not discuss another category of manipulation, which might be called manip-
ulation by misinformation, see infra note 15 and accompanying text. Ordinarily, I suspect, it is
less difficult conceptually to recognize whether challenged conduct is manipulative in this way.
Nor does this article discuss the counterpart to a squeeze, in which a short futures trader
delivers very large quantities on her contracts, thus driving the price down. Short manipulation
of this sort, however, might be subject to analysis similar to that in this article: Whereas a
squeeze is an attempt to exploit the vulnerability of the shorts arising from the unavailability of
adequate deliverable supply, the short manipulation might be an attempt to exploit the vulnera-
bility of longs arising from the unavailability of adequate facilities for handling deliveries.
4. Traditional contracts are those that, absent liquidation, call for actual delivery. I use the
term to distinguish a newer form of contract that calls for settlement in cash; that is, at expira-
tion, any unliquidated contracts are valued according to the level of some predetermined index.
Cash-settlement contracts are not subject to the type of manipulation discussed in this article; on
the other hand, they are not feasible for all commodities. See infra note 8.
For general descriptions of the mechanics of futures trading, see, e.g., 1 P. JOHNSON & T.
HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.31 (2d ed. 1988); T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF
FUTURES TRADING FOR COMMERCIAL AND PERSONAL PROFIT 43-46 (2d ed. 1977).
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later, say, the short decides that she5 would rather not deliver on her
contract, she does not have to find the long with whom she originally
dealt. Rather, all she must do is buy back a contract on the floor of
the exchange, from any willing seller. Her purchase and sale cancel
each other out; she has liquidated her position. If prices fell between
her two transactions, so that she sold dear and bought cheap, she has
made money. If prices rose, she has lost.
Most traders liquidate their positions before the contract expires.
But not all do: a small number of longs will hold their positions to the
end, standing for delivery and obligating themselves to pay the full
price of the commodity, 6 and an equal number of shorts will be obli-
gated to make delivery. Usually delivery proceeds quite smoothly.
What good does this all do? For a few traders, the futures ex-
change provides a useful means of buying physical product. For many
more, the exchange provides an important means of hedging against
price changes in the physical product. If, for example, Processor buys
a large stock of beans, she may be worried that the bottom will fall out
of the beans market before she is ready to sell her finished product.
Accordingly, she may go short in the futures market for an equal
amount of beans. Assuming the futures and physicals prices move
closely in tandem, she will recoup in the futures market any drop in
physicals prices, because when she sells the physical beans she will
liquidate her short futures position at a lower price. (If physicals
prices soar, Processor's futures position will wipe out the windfall she
would have had in the physicals market, but that is what a hedge is all
about; she intends to make her profit on processing, not on commodity
speculation.)
Many traders expect to use the market neither for delivery nor for
hedging; rather, they are pure speculators. They are essential, too, for
the market would not have sufficient liquidity without them. They
help ensure that at any given time futures prices do not stray far from
prices for similar physicals delivered at nearby places and times; if the
prices do diverge, speculators rush to arbitrage the difference away.
5. I mean "he or she," of course, but for simplicity I will make all shorts female and all longs
male.
6. At the time of contracting, traders, both long and short, are obligated to post a certain
amount of funds as margin. This is not a down payment - sellers as well as buyers must post
margin - but in essence a security bond to protect against adverse movements in price. As the
market price changes from day to day, each trader's account is "marked to market" - that is,
longs' accounts are increased to reflect price rises and decreased to reflect price falls, and shorts'
accounts are adjusted in the opposite direction. If the value of the account falls below prescribed
levels, the trader may receive a margin call - that is, be required to add funds to the account to
prevent liquidation. Ordinarily, only if a buyer stands for delivery must he pay in the full price of
his contract.
October 1990]
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Now suppose that trader Long controls a large share of the physi-
cal supply of stringbeans now available for delivery near the FNSE,
and also a large long position in the expiring futures contract. Shortly
before expiration of the contract, supplies are very tight, and the price
rises sharply. Most other long traders liquidate their positions, pro-
viding only slight relief to the shorts, who are now effectively com-
pelled either to satisfy their obligations by delivery or to deal with
Long. Long nevertheless declines for an extended period to liquidate
his futures position or to sell any of his physical supply; instead, know-
ing that if he does not liquidate promptly many of the shorts will de-
liver, he stands for delivery. At last, with prices continuing to soar
and expiration of the contract nearing, Long begins to sell futures con-
tracts. Long sells enough contracts at elevated prices so that none of
the shorts default. After expiration of the contract, prices fall quickly,
and some time afterwards Long sells off much of his remaining supply
of physicals. Soon after that, Long is charged with manipulation.
Long may well deny that he did anything wrong. Indeed, he will
likely contend that the shorts were at fault, for failing to move beans
into position for delivery. He may argue that he simply anticipated an
upward surge in the price of beans, and he should not be denied the
rewards of, or be punished for, his prescience. Or he may assert that
he had use for the physical beans and had wanted to take delivery of
them; only a very sharp price rise changed his plans, and in doing so
he was rather graciously letting the shorts off the hook.
This article addresses the perplexing and important problem of
how to distinguish valid, large-scale trading activity from a squeeze.
Part I analyzes and reformulates what I will call the price-impact test,
according to which manipulation is conduct motivated by its impact
on price. This test, I contend, states a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for characterizing conduct as a squeeze.
Part II offers a substantially different test, which I call the modi-
fied-sanctions approach. Under this approach, the price-impact test is
used as a preliminary safe-harbor standard. The modified-sanctions
approach goes further, however, recognizing that the essence of a
squeeze is exploitation of the shorts' vulnerability to default. The only
way to test for that is to determine what the price would be if the
sanctions for default were limited to the ordinary measure of contract
damages.
Part III then compares this new test to the classical approach used
by courts and other decisionmakers in squeeze cases. Here I contend
that the proposed test responds to the same factors as the classical
approach, but in a far less wooden way that better accounts for and
[Vol. 89:30
HeinOnline  -- 89 Mich. L. Rev. 34 1990-1991
Commodities Manipulation
explains their significance. Decisionmakers feeling bound to follow
the classical approach can nevertheless find enough play in its joints to
adopt the test proposed here.
Finally, an Appendix offers an examination of the economics of the
squeeze.
I. THE PRICE-IMPACT ANALYSIS EXAMINED AND
REFORMULATED
A. The Perdue Formulation
In a recent article titled Manipulation of Futures Markets: Rede-
fining the Offense, 7 Professor Wendy Collins Perdue has made a major
stride toward understanding commodities manipulation. I essentially
agree with, and so will not repeat, her careful demolition of prior anal-
yses of the problem.8 Professor Perdue's contributions are not all neg-
ative: The approach she offers, I argue, is an important step in the
right direction. But it is not an adequate solution.
Professor Perdue's analysis requires the factfinder to determine the
answer to one basic question, easy enough to conceptualize however
difficult it may be to answer in particular cases. Although her articu-
lations of that question vary somewhat, 9 I think it is best phrased sub-
jectively, something like this: Was the trader's conduct decisively
7. Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
345 (1987).
8. George Davidson advances another argument, that the manipulation problem should be
avoided by providing that futures contracts be settled in cash rather than by physical delivery -
that is, that at the close of trading any contract not offset be valued in cash according to the price
of the actual commodity. Davidson, Squeezes and Corners: A Structural Approach, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1283, 1297-98 (1985). Davidson may well be correct that cash settlement contracts should
be favored where practical because, lacking a delivery requirement, they cannot be squeezed.
Not all futures markets, however, can practically be settled in cash. Cash settlement requires
that there be another market that yields "reliable market values" and is "reasonably protected
from tampering (such as manipulation)." P. JOHNSON, FUTURES MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE AEI STUDIOS 3 (1986). Thus, futures contracts the value of which are keyed to broad-based
stock indices can practically be settled in cash. The same is not true of, say, wheat contracts -
especially since, as Davidson acknowledges, much of the trading for the physical product takes
place on the futures exchange itself. Id. at 1298. Davidson's suggestion, that the exchange "split
the contract into a delivery contract and a nondelivery contract, closing out the nondelivery
contract at the delivery contract price," id, appears to shift the problem without solving it; the
delivery contract, it appears, would still be vulnerable to manipulation.
9. Three times Perdue gives the definition an identical objective phrasing; see Perdue, supra
note 7, at 348, 393, 401; twice she gives what appears to be a subjective phrasing, see id. at 358
("manipulation occurs when the trader's expectation of profit derives from his expectation that
his transactions will affect the market"), 395-96 ("any conduct where the anticipated profitability
of that conduct depends on its affecting the price of the commodity traded"); and at least once
her phrasing is quite ambiguous, see id at 400 ("conduct that appears uneconomic about a ma-
nipulative intent" establishes a prima facie case of manipulation; the burden then shifts to the
defendant "to articulate a legitimate nonmanipulative reason for the conduct" by "proof that his
conduct was economically rational even absent an effect on price").
October 1990]
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motivated by the expectation that the conduct itself would affect the
market price, in the sense that but for the expectation he would not have
engaged in the conduct? 10 If so, then according to Professor Perdue's
analysis - which I will call the "price-impact test" - the trader is
guilty of manipulation."1
As so understood, the price-impact test has great simplicity and
elegance. Unlike the prevailing doctrine, 12 it does not resort to a
clumsy, multi-part formula, 13 but instead asks a single question that
seems intuitively to comport with our underlying notions of manipula-
tion. Perhaps the problem of defining manipulation is not nearly so
difficult as it seems; perhaps "conduct motivated by a desire to affect
market price" is essentially what we mean by "manipulation," in a
straightforward lexical sense, without the need to resort to fancy pol-
icy arguments. 14 Perhaps such lexical equivalence is why the price-
10. There is a problem implicit in the "but for" language: Large-scale economic activity
ordinarily does have a substantial price impact, and so it probably is not useful to imagine that
the trader engaged in the conduct without anticipating the impact. In any case, we can usefully
ask how the trader would have acted if he had disregarded the price impact. See infra note 58
and accompanying text.
This test is subjective because it asks whether the trader actually would have engaged in the
activity but for the price expectation - not whether the activity would have been rational but for
the expectation. In practical terms the subjective and objective tests are probably quite similar;
evidence of subjective intent could be offered on the question of objective rationality, and vice
versa. Of the two, though, the subjective test is preferable. To a large extent, commodities trad-
ing is idiosyncratic. As the term "manipulation" itself suggests, we do not castigate a trader for
making a trade that others would find irrational, but only for attempting to profit by a wrongful
method.
11. Throughout this article, I will speak of the alleged manipulator as being a single trader.
It could, of course, be numerous traders acting collusively. See, eg., note 1 supra (discussing
Ferruzzi Finanziaria and the Hunt family).
12. See Part III infra.
13. Cf. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. Rav. 165 (1985) (identifying and
criticizing "a new style of opinion writing [in] constitutional exegesis [that] emphasizes formal-
ized doctrine expressed in elaborately layered sets of'texts' or 'prongs' or 'requirements' or 'stan-
dards' or 'hurdles' ").
14. Perdue is able to cite early statements by regulators assuming that manipulation occurs
only when traders take actions to affect the market adversely. For example, the Grain Futures
Administration described manipulators as a breed of professional speculators
who trade largely on the basis of mob psychology and faith in their ability through heavy
trading to bring about temporary market conditions of which they may take advantage to
make profits....
-.. Instead of assuming a long or short position in the market, in the light of fundamen-
tal world conditions, their efforts were directed to creating a technically weak market condi-
tion, either buying the market into new high ground or selling it down and later taking
advantage of its disturbed condition.
Fluctuations in Wheat Futures: Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture Transmitting, in Re-
sponse to Senate Resolution No. 222, of June 9, 1926, a Report of The Grain Futures Administra-
tion Relative to the Extreme Fluctuation in the Price of Wheat Futures During the Early Part of
1925, at 5 (June 28, 1926), cited in Perdue, supra note 7, at 358 n.80.
The Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture quoted President Hoover describing
manipulation by a short trader as activity that has but "one purpose, and that is to depress
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impact test has the breadth that Perdue claims for it, applying to what
might be called manipulation by misinformation' 5 as well as to comers
and squeezes.
B. Failure To Act as the Essence of Manipulation: A
Reformulation of the Price-Impact Test
Simplicity and elegance are much to be desired. More critical,
however, is whether, at least most of the time, the price-impact test
leads to sensible results. In considering this question, I believe we
must add one interpretive caution, not directly addressed by Professor
Perdue, but essential to the analysis: "Conduct" must be understood
to include a failure to act.
Even if a trader - such as our old acquaintance Long - builds up
a long position over time with the anticipation that he will eventually
squeeze the market, it is not primarily his purchases that cause the
market movement from which he hopes to profit; indeed, the early
purchases make the later purchases more expensive. 16 And at the
other end, when Long reaps the rewards of his scheme by selling off
his position, his sales do not move the market in the direction he
wants: Each sale is a partial abandonment of Long's power over the
market, and if anything is likely to lower the price for subsequent
sales. It is the failure to act in between - the refusal to liquidate until
the last minute, even though the shorts have no other way out - that
drives the market in the direction he wants.
Moreover, Long might in perfect innocence take action that later,
as the futures contract nears expiration, puts him in a position to
squeeze the market. He then could exploit his position passively by
refusing to liquidate, for no reason other than that the refusal will
cause the price to soar. Suppose, for example, that Long honestly took
prices." Commodity Short Selling: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 72d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 219 (1932), quoted in Perdue, supra note 7, at 355.
15. See, eg., In re David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1182, 1188 (1971) (After purchas-
ing all available egg contracts in the last few seconds of trading, trader bid for one more just as
the final bell rang, apparently in an effort to establish a high closing price and so give an impres-
sion of an upward price trend.); In re Howard Randolph, 21 Agric. Dec. 219, 222-23 (1962)
(Trader, having made a sale of eggs with the price to be based on the spot price on the day of
delivery, artificially bid up the spot price.).
16. True, once the long builds up his position, he may relish the upward price impact that
further purchases will have. But those purchases also mean he will have a larger position to
unload in the end, and he may find that he cannot sell the incremental quantity at the same
elevated price at which he bought it. I have heard it said in this context that it is not always
possible to go out by the same door through which one comes in.
This does not, of course, mean that the timing of purchases is irrelevant in determining
whether manipulation occurred. Increasing one's long position after learning of market conges-
tion may be evidence of manipulative intent. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,289 n.12 (Dec. 17, 1982).
October 1990]
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a large long futures position to hedge a short position in the physicals
market for stringbeans. At some point, Long might realize that the
futures position is more valuable for squeezing than for hedging. Sup-
pose one of the shorts offers to sell him in an off-exchange deal some
stringbeans that, because they are located a considerable distance from
the prescribed delivery point, do not conform to the futures contract
but would satisfy his need for physicals even better than conforming
beans would. If Long refuses to deal at all for the nonconforming
beans, or pays cash for them and then delays in liquidating the long
position that was supposedly held as a hedge, he probably is abusing
his innocently gained power.
The price-impact test must therefore be understood to include fail-
ures to act as well as affirmative conduct. As so understood, the test
covers manipulation of the types discussed in the preceding two
paragraphs. Indeed, under this broad construction, the price-impact
identifies a necessary condition for a squeeze: If a long trader acts
exactly as he would if he did not expect his conduct to have any price
impact, his conduct should be considered ordinary trading activity,
and so not manipulative.
There is, however, a perplexing ambiguity in asking whether the
trader acted exactly as he would have if he did not expect his conduct
to have any price impact. Impact in this sense must be a relative term.
That is, saying that a course of conduct has no price impact can only
mean that, given that course of conduct, the price is the same as it
would have been if some alternative course or courses of conduct had
been followed. But what alternative, or alternatives, do we use to mea-
sure? If the challenged conduct were an overt act, perhaps the mea-
suring stick would be the absence of that conduct, although even that
might be ambiguous. In the case now being considered, the ambiguity
is more pressing, because the essence of the challenged conduct itself is
a failure to act - the long trader's withholding contracts and physical
product from the market.
The best approach to the problem, I believe, is to ask whether there
is any less restrictive course of conduct that the trader would have found
preferable to his actual conduct if the actual conduct had in fact led to
the same price that this less restrictive course would have. There may
be, however, an air of unreality about asking this question: We cannot
hypothesize that the trader's course of conduct would lead to a price
substantially different from the one it actually did lead to unless we
also hypothesize a change in the facts of the situation, such as the
extent of available supply, or in economic reality. This perhaps is en-
demic to the nature of causal inquiries: They may ask us to examine
[Vol. 89:30
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the consequences of counterfactual situations, and in doing so to as-
sume a change in the factor under examination (here, the price result-
ing from a given course of conduct), but not in others. 17 I will return
to this problem in Part III.
C. The Reformulated Test Avoided and Challenged
Long might offer at least three theories to show that the price im-
pact of his conduct was not a decisive factor behind his decision.
First, he may contend that in fact the conduct had no more than a
trivial price impact, because it was small on the scale of the entire
market. This would work if Long's holdings were small. But because
passivity is a form of conduct, a trader who withholds a large amount
of the commodity from the market usually must be regarded as having
had a significant price impact. An alternative course of conduct -
selling the product - would presumably have led to a substantially
lower price.
Second, Long may contend that his conduct was based on his
hopes of profiting from a price rise that he anticipated.18 He may ar-
gue that, even if the very conduct of withdrawing or withholding prod-
uct from the market contributed to the price rise, this impact was not
a precondition to his conduct. But a trader who already has large
holdings may again have difficulty making this argument convinc-
ingly: Unless he can show that he believed that the market was under-
valuing the commodity radically, he will probably not be able to prove
that he anticipated the price would rise even if he sold off his holdings.
Thus, the anticipated price rise that justified his decision not to sell
was probably caused in decisive measure by that very decision.19
Finally, and probably most plausibly for a large trader, he might
show that he actually needed the commodity and placed a high value
on using it.2o If the product was worth more in Long's hands than the
price he could get for it on the market, then he was warranted in with-
17. See generally Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. Rv. 1735, 1777-81 (1985).
18. "Simply acting on one's predictions and evaluations of publicly available information
cannot be considered manipulative, since that is what speculators are all about." In re Abrams,
[1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,408, at 35,785 (Feb. 8, 1989).
19. A trader may be able to persuade the factfinder that he made additional futures
purchases because he anticipated that the price would rise independently of his action, and that
his purchase was a large one because he had confidence in his prediction. (The Administrative
Law Judge inAbrams, supra note 18, appears to have accepted this argument with respect to late
purchases by a dominant long.) Nevertheless, as the price rises, at least in part because of the
long's acquisition, it becomes more and more difficult for him to show that it would continue to
make sense for him to acquire and retain the commodity even if he did not expect the price to be
continued to be supported by his holdings.
20. Note, for example, that Ferruzzi, S.p.A., is making this contention in its dispute concern-
ing the July 1989 CBOT soybean market. See supra note 1.
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holding it, even without taking into account the upward pressure this
would have on price. Indeed, he may go beyond denying that the
price rise was a factor causing him to withhold the product from the
market; he may atmrmatively contend that he retained the product de-
spite the price rise, which raised the implicit cost of doing so.
If Long prevails on any of these contentions, then the price-impact
test is not met, and his conduct must be considered nonmanipulative.
If, however, Long loses on each of these contentions, it will appear
that the anticipated price impact was a but-for cause of his conduct.
Yet that does not inevitably condemn the conduct as manipulative.
Having recognized that the price-impact test applies to passive con-
duct, we must now recognize that the test cannot be a sufficient condi-
tion for manipulation.
As Perdue acknowledges, "For traders to try to sell at the highest
price they can or to 'hold out' for a more advantageous price repre-
sents normal activity in the futures market as well as all other mar-
kets."'21 In any negotiation, a trader, even though intent on selling,
may hold out for a time, simply in the expectation that by doing so he
will cause potential buyers to raise their bids; but for that expectation,
the seller would make a deal earlier. As we have just seen, a potential
seller may of course hold out in hopes of better market conditions,
22
but that is not the point here; rather, the focus is on the seller who
does not expect market conditions to change but simply says to him-
self, in effect, "Declining to sell for a while will yield me a better price
in the end, all other things being equal. Therefore, I will not act now."
In some circumstances, inaction motivated in this way clearly must be
acceptable. Consider three hypotheticals.
The Ordinary Monopolist - Suppose for the moment that there is
a physicals market, but no futures market, in stringbeans, and that
Long has a monopoly in them, which he has acquired through "supe-
rior skill, foresight, and industry. ' 23 Long maximizes his profits at a
price well above his marginal cost. Thus, it would be well worth his
while to supply more product if he could do so without lowering his
price. Put another way, the decisive reason he withholds supply from
the market is the price impact of this restraint. The monopolist who
acts in this way does nothing unlawful - so long as he commits no
illegal conduct, he is entitled to charge his profit-maximizing price.
24
21. Perdue, supra note 7, at 378.
22. See supra text accompanying note 19.
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
[Vol. 89:30
HeinOnline  -- 89 Mich. L. Rev. 40 1990-1991
Commodities Manipulation
Now let us introduce futures trading into this market, but with
only a few contracts outstanding, so that the futures market has no
significant economic impact. It makes little sense to hold that this
change transforms Long's restraint, which previously was perfectly
legal, into manipulation. Thus, the simple fact that conduct was deci-
sively motivated by its anticipated price impact is not sufficient to
characterize it as manipulative.
The Early, Thin Market - A distant futures month has just begun
trading, very slowly. As of now, Long is the only trader with a long
position, and his is substantial and completely speculative. A new
trader is eager to buy a substantial long position and has bid a signifi-
cantly higher price than Long has just paid. Long finds attractive the
opportunity to turn a quick profit, and if the choice were between ac-
cepting that bid and declining to sell to the new trader at all he would
accept the bid. He also has a strong sense that if he does not jump
immediately the new trader will raise the bid a tick or two. It seems
clear to me that Long legally may play "hard to get," just as he might
in any other market, without being guilty of manipulation.
Defensive Self-Restraint - Long has decided to unload a large
long position. Having made that decision, he would offer the whole
block for sale at once - except for his expectation that to do so would
flood the market and bring him poor prices. More likely, therefore, he
will sell off little by little. This means that, at any given time, he re-
frains from selling his remaining contracts because of his expectation
of the impact on price that such conduct would have. Clearly such
prudent and ordinary market tactics should not be considered
manipulation. 25
Plainly, then, we have to go beyond the price-impact test: it states
a necessary but not sufficient condition to characterize conduct as a
squeeze. Part II attempts to discern what distinguishes a squeeze from
other conduct falling within the price-impact test.
II. DEVELOPING THE MODIFIED-SANCTIONS APPROACH
Recall the hypothetical episode presented in the introduction to
25. Perhaps we could sort out at least the Defensive Self-Restraint situation by saying that
there the inaction - refraining from selling - does not cause a price change, but rather leaves
the price where it was; it is the sale from which the trader refrained that would have caused a
change. This, however, seems too flimsy a basis on which to make any distinction. Manipulation
can consist of artificially stabilizing a price that otherwise would have fallen. In re David G.
Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1228 (1971). We have seen that inaction can be manipulative when
another course of conduct - such as making an immediate sale - would be chosen but for the
fact that the price impact of inaction on price is preferable. This is true when the price impact is
positive for inaction and nil for the decision to sell; it seems no less true when the price impact is
nil for inaction and negative for the sale.
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this article. In this Part, I present first Long's account, and then the
account of an aggressively-litigating claimant. Comparing these ac-
counts will then help us probe the nature of the commodities squeeze.
A. The Defendant's Account
Long may attempt to show in his defense that his delay in loosen-
ing his grip on the market was not at all based on his anticipation of
how that delay would affect market price. In particular, he may con-
tend that he needed the physical commodity; thus, he accepted deliv-
ery on some of his futures contracts, and sold others only when he was
able to satisfy his need in some other way or was offered a price high
enough to compensate him for the loss of the physical product.
Now suppose that the factfinder does not find credible this or other
contentions denying that the anticipated price impact was a decisive
factor guiding Long's conduct.26 Long might then argue,
I had the foresight, far in advance, to realize that supplies would likely
become tight. So I bought a large long position in the commodity. Sup-
plies did indeed become tight, perhaps in large part because of the failure
of the shorts to have similar foresight and get beans to the market, and
prices rose. Sure, I could have sold out my position and brought the
market tumbling down, but why should I have done so? Just like an
ordinary firm with large holdings in an ordinary market, I was more
hesitant to sell than I would have been if I had only small holdings. But
just like such a firm, I followed the course that would maximize my
profits, and made the most of my foresight.27
B. The Claimant's Account
Not surprisingly, the claimant will have a far different account of
Long's role in the incident. The claimant might concede that, in a
very important sense, Long did nothing worse than any other market
actor. Long fairly acquired certain assets - physical product and
contractual rights - and then, like any other market actor, deter-
mined his profit-maximizing strategy. Any other actor is entitled to
sell as much or as little of his physical commodity as he wants, at
whatever price the market will bear. Any other actor is entitled to
hold on to his futures contracts for as long as he wants, even accepting
26. See supra my discussion of three theories that Long might offer to show that the price
impact of his conduct was not a decisive factor behind that conduct.
27. The Administrative Law Judge in Abrams appears to have accepted this argument when
he held that the respondent's actions in attempting to liquidate his dominant long position "were
taken with the purpose of extracting the best possible price for his long positions, which he
established after correctly divining the market's future direction.... [Hie did nothing beyond
what speculators normally do, and indeed must do to make the market function." In re Abrams,
[1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. % 24,408, at 35,786 (Feb. 8, 1989).
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delivery on them if that will improve his economic situation. Thus,
Long appears to have made ordinary market decisions for the ordinary
purpose of determining rationally, by taking all factors into account,
what his profit-maximizing strategy should be.
In the claimant's view, however, part of the source of those profits,
exploited to the full by Long, was the vulnerability of the short trad-
ers. To understand this view, we must focus on certain characteristic
elements of a traditional28 futures contract.
Short selling is central, not peripheral, to a futures market: Recall
that there is a short for every transaction. Another of the market's
distinctive features is its anonymity. Traders must be able to enter
into contracts confidently, without having to rely on the good faith of
the trader on the other side. And the clearinghouse, which takes the
long position to every short and the short to every long,29 must simi-
larly have nearly absolute confidence in the traders. Each trader's ob-
ligation to the clearinghouse is created by virtue of her contract with
another trader, rather than by direct dealing with the clearinghouse,
and if the trader defaults it is the clearinghouse left holding the bag.
Severe sanctions for default are a crucial method by which a futures
market ensures highly regular fulfillment of its members' obligations. 30
Thus, in the typical futures market, a large number of shorts are
under a legal compulsion to buy, backed by severe sanctions if they do
not. Note the power that this gives a dominant trader such as Long.
The short interest in effect adds to the demand for the commodity an
inelastic element. That is, no matter how high the price rises - so
long as it does not rise above the very high cost to the shorts of the
sanctions for default - all the shorts will have to buy relief from their
obligations. Either they will buy (or forgo a sale of) the physical com-
modity so that they can deliver on the contract, or they will have to
buy an offsetting contract. Those who cannot find deliverable supply,
or another long trader eager to liquidate, will have to deal with Long.
If Long exploits this position - simply holding his position until
the shorts grow desperate, and then selling just enough contracts to
relieve them - he can profit enormously. In the claimant's view,
then, it was Long's decision to use this power over the shorts that
28. That is, as opposed to cash-settlement. See supra note 4.
29. See supra text accompanying note 5.
30. See, eg., CeIcAGo BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 51 (1982) (de-
faulting member is suspended until the contract is performed). Other rules are also meant to
prevent default. For example, membership on certain exchanges is very expensive, thus provid-
ing security for the members' debts. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 4, § 2.44, at 332-33.
Requirements for clearing members are even stricter. Id. at § 2.49.
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accounts for the steep rise in price just before expiration of the
contract.
C. Ordinary Monopoly and Squeeze Power Compared
The existence of a large body of shorts who are obligated to satisfy
Long's contractual rights, or suffer severe sanctions if they do not,
gives Long a degree of power far exceeding that of the monopolist of a
product for which there is no futures trading. Some potential buyers
of such a product may have a strong desire for it, but they usually are
not under legal compulsion to buy it. The monopolist simply refuses
to deal with those who do not put a high value on the product;31 this
enables him to charge a high price to the others. Ordinarily those
sales that the monopolist does make will be at a price no higher than
the value of the article to the buyer, because at a higher price the
buyer would simply do without. Even a perfect monopolist must face
what Justice Holmes called "the competition of conflicting desires."' 32
It is not surprising, therefore, that a monopolist who otherwise acts
properly is not prohibited from charging as high a price as he can.33
The squeezer, by contrast, takes advantage of shorts who may have
no use for the physical product but who must pay a high price, by
purchasing either the physical commodity or relief in the form of an
offsetting contract, to avoid default. Whereas the monopolist makes
his profit by selling physical product to those who value the product
independently, the squeezer may make most of his profit by selling
relief to those under a legal compulsion to buy. In an extreme case,
the squeezer, although potentially a low-cost supplier to the market,
removes from the market product supplied at high cost by others.34
The securities markets further illustrate the difference between a
squeezer and an ordinary monopolist. A given security, like a given
commodity, is a fungible item traded on an open market. Ordinarily a
trader does nothing improper by acquiring a dominant position in a
security - even a total monopoly of it - and refusing to sell; that,
after all, is what one does in gaining control of a company. Squeeze
31. I do not mean to put aside the situation in which the item has value to the buyer only
because she is obligated to deliver it to a third person, or to use it in making another product that
she is obligated to deliver to a third person. But the buyer's failure to meet her obligation will
usually create liability only for those damages actually suffered by the third person; this measure
of the item's economic value to the third person will effectively cap the amount the buyer is
willing to pay the monopolist to avoid default.
32. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 412 (1911) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
33. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
34. See Appendix infra.
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power arises infrequently in securities markets, because the short in-
terest at any given time is usually relatively small35 and because shorts
are generally not required to deliver on a particular date.36 Thus,
rarely is a large body of traders under an immediate legal compulsion
to buy, and those who are so compelled can almost always satisfy their
obligations without having to deal with a particular long. Securities
markets are not immune from squeezes, however. In those occasional
cases in which there is a significant short interest - that is, where the
market more closely resembles a futures market - then the shorts
may be forced to deal with a dominant long. Both the occasional oc-
currence of securities squeezes37 and their relative rarity38 therefore
35. The term "short" is used in different senses in the commodities and securities contexts.
One who sells securities on an exchange usually goes short as the term is used in the commodities
context, because most often she undertakes an obligation to deliver the securities in the future;
under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, she may deliver within five business days. But
if, as is most often the case, the seller already owns the stock, the transaction is not a short sale in
the securities sense. In a genuine short sale of stock, which is carefully regulated, see L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 645-51 (2d ed. 1988), the seller delivers to her
buyer stock that she has borrowed from a third party.
In 1987, total volume on the New York Stock Exchange was approximately 48.1 billion
shares traded. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 1988, at 75 (1988). Short sales
totaled slightly less than four billion. Id at 83. Short sales were 8.7% of round lot volume in
1986 and 8.3% in 1987. Id. at 59. Specialists' proportion of all short sales was over 40% in each
of those years: "Specialists, in performing their function of maintaining orderly markets, must
frequently sell short to meet an influx of public buy orders." Id. At year end 1987, the total of
shares listed was approximately 71.8 billion, id at 81, while the short interest was just under 500
million shares, id. at 83. In contrast, short interest in futures by definition represents 50% of
total open interest.
36. A genuine securities short seller, who borrowed the security she has delivered, may hold
her position as long as she is able to meet her margin calls - indefinitely, if she has the financial
wherewithal to withstand a significant rise in the price of the security. (A securities seller who is
short in the broader sense that she has undertaken an obligation to deliver to the exchange does
have a very limited time after making her sale in which to deliver, see supra note 35. For that
very reason, at any given time only a relatively small number of traders are obliged to deliver to
the exchange, and most of them actually possess the securities.)
A situation more analogous to the commodities markets occurs when a trader sells a "naked"
call option; that is, without owning a given security, she sells the right to purchase the security
for a particular price on a particular date. J. MILLER, OPTIONS TRADING 100-01 (1975). This
practice, however, is relatively limited: most of those who sell call options do so as a hedge
against ownership of the underlying security. Id. at 1 L
37. See, eg., Sontag, Stock Manipulation Case a Blast From the Past, NATL. L.J., Feb. 20,
1989, at 13 (describing alleged comer of stock in Chase Medical Group, Inc.); see also A. BROM-
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.6 (455) (1975) (cor-
ners are possible in securities markets but are more likely to occur in commodities markets
because of the expiration date built into futures contracts, the equal number of short and long
positions in any contract, the seasonal variations in supplies of many commodities, and the logis-
tics of delivery). Also, although failure to deliver securities gives rise to liability for damages,
suspension is not inevitable. See Rules of Board: Settlement of Contracts, 2 NYSE Guide Deal-
ings and Settlements (CCH) 2180 (Feb. 9, 1968). Depending on how damages are calculated,
the value to a short of avoiding default may be less than in the commodities markets.
38. See Sontag, supra note 37 ("[M]ost of the SEC staffers working on [the Chase Medical
Group case] had never tackled anything like it, the American Stock Exchange went back to the
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illustrate the importance of a large short interest, subject to severe
sanctions, in making commodity squeezes attainable.
D. Defining a Squeeze and Developing a Test
We have seen that, although ordinary monopoly pricing and a
squeeze both involve withholding supply from the market to push the
price up, only the squeezer does so by exploiting the vulnerability of
the shorts to sanctions. This distinction suggests a concise definition
of a squeeze, modified from the price-impact test: To qualify as a
squeeze, the price impact of the trader's conduct in exploiting the vul-
nerability of the shorts to sanctions for default must be a but-for cause
of the conduct. The preceding discussion supports the theoretical ac-
curacy of this definition, but transforming it into an operational test
requires further analysis.
1950s before it could recall a similar matter, and one standard business-school textbook describes
the fraud as so improbable it is 'of historic interest only.' ").
In addition to the factors discussed in the text, another consideration might help explain the
relative rarity of the securities squeeze: a bright line rule for determining whether a squeeze has
occurred is more workable for securities than for futures. That makes securities squeezes more
easily detectable, and also gives traders clearer warning of the conduct they should avoid. The
bright-line rule, simply stated, is this: A trader may not buy rights to more than the amount of
the security outstanding. Cf 3 L. Loss, SECURrrIEs REGULATION 1538 n.26 (2d ed. 1961) ("A
corner is a purchase of more than the available supply of a security (or commodity) with the
intention of forcing settlement from short sellers at the purchaser's figure.").
One reason the rule works reasonably well in the securities context is that it is easy to deter-
mine when the rule is violated. Moreover, the rule usually yields sound results. If a securities
trader violates the rule, he is probably squeezing, because no valid reason for such an acquisition
is apparent. And if the securities trader does not violate the bright line rule, it usually is difficult
to conclude that he is squeezing, because he can say that his intention was simply to acquire and
retain more of the security than he previously had (and, in the case of common stock, a control-
ling interest in the company). The plausibility of this alternative explanation would make it
almost impossible to prove that such a trader's conduct actually was determined by its price
impact and his willingness to exploit the shorts.
Now consider the difficulties that would beset a comparable rule in the futures context. In-
stead of speaking of outstanding securities, such a rule would be worded in terms of deliverable
supply. But often there is a good deal of ambiguity as to what supply is deliverable or can be
made deliverable before the contract expires. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48. More-
over, a futures trader who buys contracts for more of a commodity than is currently deliverable
may have innocent explanations; he may, for example, not have any firm idea ofjust how much is
deliverable, or he may legitimately need more than is currently deliverable. And, on the other
side of the coin, even if we could say confidently that the trader did not buy contracts for more of
the commodity than is or would be deliverable, we cannot say confidently that he is not squeez-
ing. A trader might, for example, buy a large position while supplies are still plentiful, and then
gain squeezing power simply by holding on to the position while attrition diminishes the amount
of deliverable supply. Or, even if the trader's position is always less than the amount of supply
technically deliverable, the trader may still have some squeezing power if a significant amount of
that supply is committed elsewhere and could not be made available for delivery against futures
obligations without incurring substantial additional costs. See generally Perdue, supra note 7, at
383-85 (criticizing the definition of manipulation suggested in McDermott, Defining Manipula-
tion in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze," 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 202 (1979)-
"threatening to take delivery of the same thing twice" - for failing to explain why it is improper
for the long to expect the shorts to fulfill their contractual obligations).
HeinOnline  -- 89 Mich. L. Rev. 46 1990-1991
Commodities Manipulation
The proposed definition requires the factflnder to ask whether the
defendant withdrew or withheld from the market the same amount of
supply that he would have had he not taken into account the price
impact of the shorts' vulnerability to default. Thus, the standard
against which the defendant's conduct is measured is one of self-abne-
gation - he is required to put out of mind an aspect of reality that
might in fact have been beneficial to him. In effect, the factfinder
needs to devise a hypothetical market that lacks the shorts' vulnerabil-
ity but otherwise is as close as possible in material respects to the ac-
tual market, and then ask whether Long would have withheld supply
from that market to the same degree as he actually did.
The vulnerability exists because (1) there is a large body of shorts,
and (2) they are subject to severe penalties for default. We could thus
create an imaginary market without vulnerable shorts by hypotheti-
cally altering either of these conditions.
This choice raises an interesting ambiguity, somewhat akin to one
noted with reference to the price-impact test.3 9 The analysis proposed
here asks how a trader would have acted but for a given condition, the
vulnerability of the shorts. It is apparent, though, that this condition
could, hypothetically, be removed in more than one way. And how
the trader might act would presumably depend on just how the condi-
tion is removed - that is, on just what hypothetical we imagine.
This ambiguity, I suspect, infects virtually all causation tests based
on counterfactual hypotheses. 40 I do not believe I need linger over the
difficulty here. Ordinarily, at least, it is too large an alteration of ma-
terial reality to imagine that the short futures interest was very
small.41 It is better instead to imagine an alteration of the rules deter-
mining sanctions, for they are imposed on the market rather than re-
flecting the forces of supply and demand. Thus, we can ask how Long
would have acted if the system of sanctions did not augment his power
over the shorts.
In actuality, the penalties for default are so heavy that a short will
39. See supra note 17.
40. See Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law (pt. 2), 52
CALIF. L. Rv. 764, 776-77 (1964).
41. If the short open interest were very small, then Long could not have his corresponding
long futures position. This means at the very least that the hypothetical alteration of the market
is not a simple one; we are imagining not just a change in the environment but in Long's own
holdings. Perhaps it would be useful in some cases to ask a question such as: "Long stood for
delivery of physical commodity of a given amount when price was at a certain level. If Long did
not have futures for that amount, would he have bought that quantity in physicals at that price?"
But in other cases Long could justly contend that his futures position was his means of gathering
up supply early, and that he should be allowed to reap the rewards of doing so, just as a trader in
a market without futures contracts would be.
October 1990]
HeinOnline  -- 89 Mich. L. Rev. 47 1990-1991
Michigan Law Review
almost always pay the market price rather than default. Moreover, if
damages are measured by market price, Long's power over the shorts
would not be significantly diminished even if the other penalties for
default were mild. Long's ability to withhold a substantial amount of
supply from the market gives him the ability to select the market price
that maximizes his profit, including the profit from damages payments
by the shorts. Given that those damages themselves are measured by
market price, Long has a strong incentive to withhold supply and
drive the price higher. Higher prices will encourage more shorts to
deliver, giving Long product that he does not want and of which he
must dispose. Yet no matter how high the price goes, those shorts
who cannot deliver would still find it better to liquidate at the market
price than to breach and to pay penalties in addition to market price
damages.
Now suppose that the only sanction on a defaulting short was that
prescribed by the general rule of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
section 1-106 - that is, payment of the amount of damages that
would "put [the long] in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed." 42 What would the long's conduct be if this were the
prevailing rule? We can break this question down into three parts.
First, if this were the rule, how would breach by a short alter the
long's situation? In other words, what would the damages be? The
answer to this question ultimately depends on Long's need for the
product. Consider two cases. In Case 1, Long has use for additional
product at the market price, even after he has produced all he can
supply himself at marginal cost below that price, and even though he
believes he could buy product at substantially lower prices at a far
distant point or at a later time. Thus, the breach means he must either
do without the product here and now or cover at the market price. In
this case, damages presumably would be the market price less the con-
tract price.
Alternatively, as Case 2, suppose that Long has no need for addi-
tional product at this time and place; indeed, he is already pressing the
price up by withholding supply from the market (as either a squeezer
or an ordinary monopolist might do). In that case, additional product
delivered by the short would simply have been added to Long's hold-
ings and sold later (if at all), presumably at a lower price.43 Damages
42. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1989).
43. Perhaps Long would argue that, if the short had delivered, that would have taken avail-
able supply from other shorts, and made them eager to liquidate at a higher price. Such an
argument is circular; it essentially treats Long's ability to squeeze the market as an asset entitled
to legal protection. Moreover, this argument assumes that the short's performance would have
been by delivery of product that otherwise would have been delivered by another short,
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- if any - should be no greater than the excess of that later price,
rather than the current market price, over the contract price. More-
over, if Long could cover for the undelivered beans by producing addi-
tional beans himself more cheaply than that lower price, then damages
should probably be equal to the cost of production less the contract
price. This analysis appears to be in accord with general principles of
contract damages."4
Second, given the appropriate measure of damages, what would the
shorts do? As we have seen, where the measure of damages is the mar-
ket price less the contract price, as in Case 1, a short presumably
would comply with her contracts: breach would offer her no advan-
tage compared to default, and would involve some penalties. Even if
she did breach, the long's position would not be materially altered,
because the damages award is designed to allow him to buy what he
needs on the market.
In Case 2, however, where the measure of damages is based on the
anticipated drop in the market, or on a cost of production lower than
the market price, then presumably the shorts would breach. In these
cases, it would be cheaper to breach than to deliver. What is more, in
such a case breach would be the most efficient course of conduct:4
5
44. Although market-price damages are most often available for the buyer who chooses not
to cover, see U.C.C. § 2-713 comment 5 (1989), they are not always appropriate. As Justice
Stone wrote long ago, "The test of market value is at best but a convenient means of getting at
the loss suffered. It may be discarded and other more accurate means resorted to if, for special
reasons, it is not exact or otherwise not applicable." Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 64-
65 (1930). As my colleague James J. White has pointed out, courts have adhered to this flexible
approach even in the face of the seemingly absolute language of UCC § 2-713. White, The De-
cline of the Contract Market Damage Model, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 2 (1988). In Nobs
Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980), for example, the court consid-
ered § 2-708(2), which supplements the market-price rule when it is "inadequate" to put the
seller in as good a position as she would have been under performance. This rule cuts both ways,
the court held: If the market-price rule provides excessive damages, it should be abandoned. 616
F.2d at 215. For the reasons stated in the text, Long's Case 2 is one of those in which the
market-price rule overstates damages. Cf Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus.,
675 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.) (recognizing internal cover as a valid remedy), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 865
(1982); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-4, at 253 (3d ed. 1988)
(drafters of the UCC probably did not intend to supplant the remedy available under § 2-712 by
allowing a higher award under § 2-713, thus giving buyers an incentive not to cover).
Courts sometimes go beyond treating market-price damages as excessive; under the doctrine
of hindrance, which may amount to a rough form of antimanipulation law, a defaulting seller can
avoid damages by showing that the buyer's actions completely prevented performance. See 5 W.
JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 677A (3d ed. 1961); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 295 (1932) (illustration 3). Indeed, in earlier times, activity that interfered with the supply of
goods to the market constituted the criminal offense of forestalling. G. CRABB, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 312 (Burlington ed. 1831).
45. See, eg., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107 (3d ed. 1986) (promisor has
incentive to breach where profit from breach, less damages equal to promisee's expected profit
from completion of contract, exceeds expected profit from completion of the contract). But see
Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) (criticizing efficient breach
theory because, inter alia, courts may improperly assess expectation damages; also, a unilateral
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delivery would mean that additional supply is brought to the market
at high cost, only to be held by Long until a later time when Long
resells to low-value users.
Third, given the anticipated action of the shorts, what would the
long do? In Case 1 - that is, where Long needed the physical product
- he would effectively use his futures contracts to make desired
purchases. Either the shorts would deliver or he would use a sum
awardable in damages to cover on the market. Clearly, he would not
have any incentive to push the price any higher than he would if the
contracts were ordinary cash contracts for the commodity. The shorts
would not be vulnerable to default.
Nor - and this is the key - would the shorts be vulnerable in
Case 2, in which Long's holdings are more than he needs, given the
market price. Given that the market price is higher than the cost of
breach, pressing the market price higher would not exploit the shorts
- they would all breach anyway and pay damages. Long's best alter-
native therefore would be to mitigate his damages, setting the price
and output that would maximize his profit from sale of physicals and
then collecting damages from the defaulting shorts. That output may
be restrictive - it may, that is, reflect the market power that Long's
extensive holdings give him - but it is not based on vulnerability of
the shorts to default sanctions.
This, at last, appears to solve the problem. If ordinary contract
damages, as measured by UCC section 1-106, were the only sanction
against a breaching short, then the shorts would not have had any
vulnerability to default that Long could have exploited. The way
Long would have acted had this been the rule therefore presents the
standard against which his actual conduct should be measured.
We can now create an operational test of a squeeze. Recall that
the price-impact test created a necessary but not sufficient test for a
squeeze. The analysis presented here shows that the long trader's con-
duct should be considered a squeeze only when the anticipated price
impact underlying that conduct results from the vulnerability of the
shorts to sanctions for default. We could therefore ask, "Would the
long trader have engaged in the same course of conduct if the price
impact of that conduct were the same as in a market in which the only
sanction for default were the ordinary measure of contract damages?"
The test is, however, considerably more tractable if broken down
into two parts. First is the price-impact test: Is there any less restric-
breach potentially leads to a costly dispute over damages, thus exhausting any savings in transac-
tion costs).
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tive course of conduct that the trader would have found preferable to his
actual conduct if the actual conduct had in fact led to the same price as
this less restrictive course? This is a "safe harbor" test, because if the
answer is negative the conduct should, without further inquiry, be
considered not to be a squeeze. If the answer is affirmative, it then
becomes necessary to ask a second question: If the only sanction for a
short's default were the ordinary measure of contract damages, would
the long trader have withheld supply to a lesser extent than he did? If
the answer to this question, as well as the first, is affirmative, then the
trader squeezed the market.46 I shall call this two-part approach the
modified-sanctions test.
Lest there be any confusion: I do not suggest that the sanctions for
default actually should be limited to damages under section 1-106. I
take it as essential for the proper function of the futures market that
the shorts ordinarily regard default as virtually unthinkable. But the
sanctions for default are meant to ensure performance by the shorts.
They are not meant to distort the conduct of a dominant long, encour-
aging him to take an economically inefficient course so that perform-
ance by the shorts will be hindered and he can exploit their
desperation. Thus, it makes sense to require the long to act as he
would if the sanctions merely compensated him for any loss caused by
a breach.
III. EVALUATING THE MODIFIED-SANCTIONS TEST
This Part evaluates the modified-sanctions test by examining how
it relates to four criteria that are essential elements of a squeeze under
what may be called the "classical" definition:47 market dominance,
46. Logically, this two-part test is not completely equivalent to the question in quotation
marks: A case could be conceived, perhaps, in which the price impact of a trader's conduct and
the sanctions rule were both but-for causes of that conduct, but the price impact of the conduct
attributable to the sanctions rule was not. Such a case would be rare at best. Even if the result of
the unitary test in this case were better, which is by no means clear, the two-part test would be
generally superior, because it is easier to articulate, to understand, and to apply. Indeed, the
price-impact portion of the test will often screen out clear cases of nonmanipulation.
In most cases, if the defendant loses on the second branch of the two-part test, he would also
lose on the first, the price impact issue. Nevertheless, the price impact issue should be retained as
part of the test. For one thing, as noted above, it may often act as a screen, obviating the need for
fruitless inquiry. Also, in some cases a long might fail on the second branch of the test but not
the first, and in these he probably should not be considered a manipulator. That is, it is probably
unfair to condemn a long who believes that (1) the price impact of his own position is too small
to be a decisive factor in making his trading decisions, but (2) his long position is worth retaining
because the shorts will be desperate to avoid default.
47. Various cases and commentaries give different formulations of the classical approach.
The one I use here is essentially that of In re Cox, [1986-87 Transfer binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,786, at 34,061 (CFTC 1987); see also 3 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 4, at
42-44; In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,297 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, Commr., concurring).
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artificial price, causation, and intent.
This discussion has two aims. The first is to show that the modi-
fied-sanctions approach yields sensible results, responding to the fac-
tors that courts have recognized as relevant, but articulating and
explaining their significance better than the classical approach does.
The classical approach demands yes-or-no answers to questions that
are inherently matters of degree, and so invites linguistic manipulation
that makes the questions meaningless. The modified-sanctions analy-
sis avoids this brittleness. Further, it does so without descending into
the mush at the other extreme - a wide-open balancing test that
would simply tell the factfinder, in deciding whether manipulation oc-
curred, to take into account "all the circumstances." The modified-
sanctions approach does not ignore any relevant circumstance, but it
sets forth clearly the bottom-line questions that the factfinder should
be attempting to answer as it considers the evidence.
Second, by showing how the standard criteria play a part in an-
swering the question posed by the modified-sanctions approach, I hope
to demonstrate that a court or agency could implement this analysis
with very little maneuvering even if it felt bound to pay deference to
the classical definition.
Market dominance - Under the classical approach, one of the ele-
ments of the cornering offense is domination of the combined futures
and physical markets.48 The classical approach treats the dominance
question as binary - that is, as one that can be answered either yes or
no.49 In seeking an answer to that question, factfinders must answer a
closely related question that is also treated as binary: whether a given
source of the commodity in question should be considered part of the
"deliverable supply," which could have been used to satisfy the shorts'
48. A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 37, § 4.6(456) (no corner can be effective
unless the trader has a sizable long position at the critical time and, if the cash supply is large
enough to be a significant factor for the shorts, the trader must also control the cash supply to
some degree). As indicated before, see supra note 3, I draw no sharp distinction between a
squeeze and a corner; although a corner is sometimes said to require dominance of the physical
supply, a squeeze presupposes enough control over the futures contract to acquire a dominant
position in the market for physicals.
49. Compare Great Western Food Distrib. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir.) ("a
coincidence of Great Western's dominant long position and control of the available cash sup-
ply"), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953) and In re Compania Salvadorena De Cafe, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,886, at 21,817 (CFTC 1983) (artificial price
"was caused by Falla's acquisition and maintenance of a dominant long position in the future for
Salvadorena's accounts") with Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962)
("In the present case, the petitioners did not control the supply of 'certificated cotton.' ") and In
re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,786, at 34,063 (CFTC
1987) ("Cox and Frey could not foreclose the shorts' delivery option and thus lacked the ability
to influence market prices."). See also In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,302 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, Commr.,
concurring) (objecting to the binary treatment of the deliverable supply issue).
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futures obligations.50
This binary treatment is a serious flaw in the classical approach,
because dominance is inherently a matter of degree. As the Appendix
shows, the extent of a long trader's dominance varies, depending on
how much additional product other market actors would be able to
supply at high prices; on how much product buyers would demand at
high prices; and on how large a long position the purportedly domi-
nant trader had.
The Appendix assumes away the question of deliverability,51 but
that too is usually a matter of degree, or more precisely a matter of
price - inconvenient supply can often be feasibly delivered if the price
rises far enough.52 The more feasible delivery of a given supply is, the
less dominance a large trader has.
Now examine the significance of market dominance under the
50. See, eg., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1165 (8th Cir. 1971) (hard wheat ex-
cluded from the deliverable supply of wheat), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); Great W. Food
Distrib., 201 F.2d at 480-81 (fresh eggs and out-of-town refrigerator eggs excluded from the
deliverable supply of eggs), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311
F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962) (uncertificated cotton included in the deliverable supply of cotton); In
re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,287 (CFTC 1982) (corn "not irrevocably committed" included in the deliverable
supply of corn); In re Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786 at
34,061-63 (CFTC 1987) (committed wheat in Chicago excluded, but barge wheat controlled by
the dominant short and premium grades of wheat in Kansas City included in the deliverable
supply of Chicago wheat).
51. See infra Appendix.
52. Consider, for example, the heroic efforts made by Philip Armour, who found himself
caught short without deliverable stocks of wheat in 1897. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 4, at 323.
Stocks in Chicago declined from 10 million bushels in late April to 1.7 million bushels in late
August, amidst rumors of a corner and of small European and Indian crops. Armour's valiant
efforts to move wheat into deliverable position included "running tugs continuously and using
dynamite to keep the frozen waterways open from Duluth." Id. By the end of December, stocks
of wheat rose to 9.7 million bushels, and Armour filled all of his contracts. Id. Armour's experi-
ence shows that, sometimes at least, enough money can buy almost anything. Cf 0. HENRY,
Mammon and the Archer, in THE COMPLETE WORKS 53 (1953) (money used to buy time, and
time used well to acquire love).
Determining what supply is deliverable is closely akin to determining the bounds of the "rele-
vant market" in an antitrust case, an enterprise on whose value some noted scholars have sagely
cast doubt. For example, Philip Areeda and Louis Kaplow argue:
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that market definition and the defendant's market
share give, at best, only a suggestion of defendant's market power. The boundaries of any
product and geographic market are necessarily imprecise. The universe of existing produ-
cers, however broadly defined, cannot account for ease of entry by other finns. Nor do
market shares speak of relative production costs, the expansion potential of other firms,
their independence or dynamism, scope and direction of market changes, buyer power, or
nonmarket forces. In addition, market power is intrinsically a matter of degree, which is
often lost sight of by a process of market definition that either wholly includes or excludes
substitutes at the initial stages of the assessment. But even if such problems are overcome,
the power implications of any particular market share remain obscure.
P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 580-81 (4th ed. 1988). Frederick Rowe goes
even further:
In my view, the concept of "the market" is the weakest link in antimonopolization and
antimerger law. Having eluded antitrust scholars for over a generation, the "correct" mar-
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modified-sanctions approach. Unless a trader has a dominant long po-
sition, his purchases (or refusals to sell) cannot move the market in a
way that will profit him. If a trader with only a small long position
refuses to liquidate, he will probably have no significant market impact
at all. A trader with a more substantial, but not dominant, long posi-
tion may cause a price increase if he delays liquidation, but he will
probably not be able to profit from it. Most of the shorts will probably
be able to go elsewhere to cover their obligations, and when the long
finally does liquidate he may well bring the market down by as much
as he previously raised it. When a long trader substantially dominates
the market, however, so that a large number of the shorts have no-
where else to go to avoid default, the situation is much different.
Then, and only then, can the rational but greedy long trader hope that
an otherwise unwarranted refusal to liquidate will be a sensible strat-
egy, because the refusal itself likely will drive the price far higher.
In the modified-sanctions model, then, the issue of market domi-
nance plays its proper role. Unless the trader had a dominant posi-
tion, it would not have made sense for him to make buying and selling
decisions with the hope that he could profit from the impact of his
conduct on market price. The more dominant the position, the more
attractive a squeeze is to the greedy trader - and thus the more likely
it is an accurate explanation of his behavior. Thus, under the modi-
fied-sanctions model, a factfinder would not answer the dominance
question yes or no, but would attempt to gauge the extent of market
dominance. In doing so, the factfinder would not be required to ask
artificial binary questions such as, "Should those distant beans be con-
sidered part of the deliverable supply?" Instead, it would ask ques-
tions of economic substance, such as, "Given the difficulty in getting
those beans to market, how much power did the defendant have to
push the price up simply by delaying liquidation?"
Price Artificiality - Under the classical model, analyses of manip-
ulation have often turned on whether the price of the futures contract
in question was artificial. Sometimes this inquiry has depended on
whether that price was historically unusual, either absolutely or in re-
ket remains a mirage. On the eve of antitrust's centennial celebration, waiting for the mar-
ket is waiting for Godot.
By now, wise observers know that competition defines the market, not vice versa; that no
market can contain competition among modem multi-product firms; that the market is a
still snapshot in frozen time, unable to sense change or innovation; that the process of com-
petition defies quantification; and hence that the concept of a finite, objectively defined mar-
ket is an ever-receding mirage.
Rowe, Market as Mirage, 75 CALIF. L. Rnv. 991, 991, 995 (1987) (emphases in original; citations
deleted).
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lationship to other prices. No doubt, as Perdue acknowledges, an unu-
sual price is relevant evidence in determining the probability that a
market was manipulated.5 3 But, as she correctly argues, an unusual
price is not conclusive evidence of manipulation.54 It may merely re-
flect an appropriate market response to unusual conditions.
An alternative approach is to define an artificial price as one not
reflecting the legitimate forces of supply and demand. 5" This ap-
proach obviously and overwhelmingly begs the question. A trader's
decision to buy or to retain a long futures position certainly cannot be
considered illegitimate simply because he has no desire for the physi-
cal commodity represented by the contract; the vast majority of ordi-
nary futures purchases, both speculations and hedges, are made by
traders who have no expectation of taking delivery. Nor would it suf-
fice to say that the futures price is artificial if it does not reflect the
"real world" factors of supply and demand in the physicals market.
That presupposes the illusory ability to determine with confidence just
what, and how strong, those factors are and which price they would
yield if not tainted by some improper factor. Moreover, trading deci-
sions in the futures markets ordinarily are responses to anticipated
outside factors. The physicals market may be too thin, and so at any
given time may not accurately reflect the factors that traders believe
should affect a commodity's price. Often it is the futures market, with
its greater liquidity and ease of trading, that better registers these fac-
tors. If the futures market leads the physicals market, it is probably
just performing its job.
The modified-sanctions analysis offers a satisfactory solution to
these difficulties. Recall the element of artificiality in Long's case: his
ability to drive the price up sharply was not based principally on the
value of the uses to which potential buyers would put the physical
commodity. Rather, the key factor was that the shorts needed to
avoid default, and with it the draconian sanctions that far exceeded
any value of the physical commodity. In an actual case, it may be
impossible to assess whether, or to what extent, that factor has actu-
ally determined the price. Fortunately, we do not necessarily have to
do so; it is enough if the long's expectation of such a price impact was
a but-for cause of his conduct.
Such a determination does not depend on characterizing the result-
ing price as artificial. But neither is the analysis stymied if binding law
53. Perdue, supra note 7, at 369-70.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 370; T. Russo, supra note 3, § 12.24.
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is deemed to make the price artificiality question critical. Given that
the sanctions for default far exceed the economic loss caused by
breach, it is easy to characterize as artificial any price resulting from a
long's attempt to exploit the shorts' vulnerability to those sanctions.
Suppose, for example, that Long gives the following soul-baring
explanation of his decision to retain his large long futures position un-
til just before expiration:
I had no use for the physical beans represented by these contracts. And
the price of these contracts was very high in relation to historical levels,
to physical string beans available elsewhere, to futures contracts in other
months, and to other commodities that usually have similar trading pat-
terns. Therefore, it wouldn't have made sense for me to hold my posi-
tion as long as I did, except that I knew that the longer I held it the more
desperate the shorts would become, because they had to deal with me or
default and face very expensive sanctions. Thus, holding out to the last
minute drove the price way up, and I profited handsomely.
Surely it does no violence to language to label as illegitimate the de-
mand represented by Long's decision to delay liquidation, or to say
that the resulting price is artificial. Of course, most defendants will
not readily admit improper motivation. A factfinder might neverthe-
less be able to infer the defendant's true motivations from the
circumstances.
In making that inference, the factfinder might rely in part on a
historically unusual pricing pattern. Just as in the classical approach,
the factfinder might determine whether the price of the future in ques-
tion was abnormally high, either absolutely or in comparison to other
prices - for physicals, other contract months, or other commodities.
If it was, that may be relevant for at least two reasons.
First, the greater the price abnormality, the greater the likelihood
that something unusual caused it. Perhaps that something was a rare
congruence of fundamental factors, or perhaps it was a negligent fail-
ure of the shorts to enable themselves to make delivery. But it could
also have been the conduct of the defendant, in refusing to let go of a
large long position as the contract neared expiration.
Second, as suggested by Long's confession, a price abnormality
should make the factfinder ask seriously why the defendant acted as he
did in holding on to his position. There may well be innocent explana-
tions - if, for example, the defendant had real need of the physicals
that he could gain by standing for delivery. The more the price of the
expiring future was out of kilter, however, the more likely that the
defendant's decision was motivated by his realization that his stead-
fastness could drive the price upwards. If the defendant was not
manipulating, then a large abnormality would usually be corrected
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rather quickly by market forces - or at least the defendant would
expect such a correction, and so would be unlikely to hold his position
rather than cashing in quickly at an apparently attractive price.
Causation - The classical approach asks whether the long trader's
activity caused the elevated price.56 If the question is taken literally,
the answer is obvious: Of course the conduct of a large long trader, in
buying contracts or declining to sell, is a significant factor in determin-
ing the price, in the sense that the price would be lower if the long did
not hold such a large position. Alternatively, the question of causation
may be taken to state a more difficult issue: Who should be blamed for
the sharp price move - the shorts, who failed to move enough supply
into deliverable position, or the long, who insisted on holding the
shorts to their obligations?
57
Once more, the modified-sanctions approach provides a satisfac-
tory solution to the conundrum. If the long would not have held his
position but for the anticipated impact that it would have on market
price by increasing the pressure on the shorts to avoid default, then he
is guilty of manipulation, even if the shorts had no good excuse for
their inability to perform. The reason is plain enough. If that antici-
pated price impact was critical to the long's decision, then he did not
hold his position because of its economic value but rather because he
could make a profit by putting pressure on the shorts. No economic
value lies in allowing the long to profit from such game-playing. In-
deed, such a technique, apart from being oppressive to the shorts, cre-
ates potentially serious inefficiencies by distorting the price and by
encouraging shorts to move supply into deliverable position for no
good economic reason. If the long, complaining of unfairness, argues
that he has a right to stand on his contract rights, there is a ready
56. "The question is ... whether the artificially high price was caused by [the long trader,]
Cargill." Cargill Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1169 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972); see also Great Western Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482-83 (7th Cir.)
(defendant's conduct must have "resulted in" artificial prices), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953);
Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58-60 (5th Cir. 1972) (conduct must "produce"
or "create" artificial prices); In re Cox [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
% 23,786, at 34,067 (CFTC 1987); In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,796, at 27,301 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, Commr.,
concurring).
57. For a discussion of this issue in terms of causation, see for example, 3 P. JOHNSON & T.
HAZEN, supra note 4, § 5.21, at 79-83, which discusses Volkart Brothers, 311 F.2d 52, and In re
Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796 (CFTC 1982). In each of those cases, the blame was placed on the shorts; by contrast,
Cargill, 452 F.2d 1154, put blame on the long.
Notwithstanding harsh treatment by the Cargill court, in recent years Volkart has been ac-
corded substantial respect. See In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,786, at 34,062 (CFTC 1987); In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assn., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,290, 27,292 (CFTC 1982) (Johnson,
Chmn., concurring); McDermott, supra note 38, at 220 n.89.
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answer: "Not for that reason you don't. This limitation is read into
your contract as a matter of law, so there is no unfairness."
Now suppose by contrast that the long actually did want to hold
his position, even without considering the impact on the shorts of do-
ing so. Then it is perfectly appropriate to hold the shorts accountable
for their failure to deliver, even if the result of their attempts to cover
themselves drives the price sharply up. In other words, a short who
holds her position until near the end of the contract month without
being in a position to deliver takes a chance. If the contract liquidates
in an orderly fashion, so that she has no difficulty finding cover, then
she will not suffer. And if there is a price jump but the only reason for
it is that a long has decided to take advantage of her inability to de-
liver, then she will not be held accountable. But if she has misjudged
the situation - if a long, without taking into account the difficulty he
is creating for the shorts, wants to hold his position until just before
the contract expires, or even to take delivery on it, and she is unable to
make delivery - then she must bear the consequences.
Intent - Although intent is an essential element of a squeeze
under the classical approach, it is the intent to create an artificial
price, and this does not advance the analysis. There can be no satisfac-
tory determination of this intent until the problem of defining price
artificiality is solved - something the classical approach has not been,
and will not be, able to do.
In the modified-sanctions model, by contrast, intent is the central
issue; price artificiality is defined, if a definition is deemed necessary, in
terms of the intent with which the dominant long undertook the action
that caused the price abnormality. Intent in this model is not so much
a matter of purpose - the long's aim, whether manipulative or not, is
presumably to make money - as of rationale. If the long would have
withheld less supply but for his anticipation that his conduct would
raise the price by pressuring the shorts to avoid the sanctions for de-
fault, then he has acted manipulatively.
I have suggested that this "but for" test be broken down into two
parts. The first asks how the trader would have acted but for his antic-
ipation of the price impact of his conduct; the second asks how he
would have acted under a lesser system of sanctions. Both questions
depend on hypotheticals, and that might seem to present problems.
Given that the trader held a large position, his conduct, whether active
or passive, almost certainly did have a significant price impact. It
therefore does not seem useful in presenting the first question to sup-
pose that the conduct did not have any actual or anticipated impact on
prices; that would require that in our hypothetical world fundamental
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economic law be suspended, or at least that the trader thought it was.
We should, therefore, ask what the long would have done if he simply
did not take the anticipated impact into account. The second ques-
tion, similarly, asks what the long would have done had he put out of
mind the additional pressure created by a system of punitive sanctions
for default.
It might seem strange to base the determination as to whether
trading is manipulative on what the trader hypothetically would have
done had he ignored perhaps the most significant impact of his deci-
sion or a key rule of the market in which he operated. But remember
that a squeeze may be rational economic behavior given the circum-
stances, an attempt by the long to maximize profits by taking into ac-
count all relevant considerations. The essence of the ban on squeezing
is not that the aim of the long - maximizing profits - is improper.
Rather, it is that in doing so there are some factors that a dominant
long must not attempt to exploit; in other words, he must put certain
profit considerations out of mind. There is nothing remarkable about
a rule requiring a person to act as he would if some aspect of reality
were altered or disregarded. 58
I do not pretend that it will always be easy to determine whether
an alleged squeezer has acted in this way. A trader will rarely articu-
late a manipulative rationale, perhaps not even to himself. As in many
other legal contexts, the factfinder must operate from circumstantial
evidence. There will usually be many clues: Did the long refuse to sell
even though his contracts were priced abnormally high, in absolute
terms or in relation to other contracts? Did he unload at a substan-
tially lower price much of the commodity on which he had stood for
delivery? Or, on the other hand, did he put the physical commodity to
a use for which there was no cheaper alternative? There is nothing
novel about asking these evidentiary questions in a squeeze case. The
approach presented here, however, shows their true significance - as
aids in answering the bottom-line question of whether the defendant
58. For example, a fiduciary must disregard the consequences for his own welfare of conduct
that also effects the beneficiary of his trust. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E.
545, 548 (1928) (by becoming a fiduciary, defendant "put himself in a position in which thought
of self was to be renounced, however hard the abnegation") (Cardozo, C.J.); IIA A. Scorr & W.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 436 (1987) ("his interest must yield to that of the benefi-
ciaries"). And, although it would "ignore reality" to deny the risk of possible injury that private
biases might inflict on a child living with a step-parent of a different race, a judge may have to do
just that; such biases and risk are not "permissible considerations for removal of an infant child
from the custody of its natural mother." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 430, 433 (1984). Indeed, as
Fred Schauer points out, inherent in the nature of any rule is that it screens off one or more
factors that the decisionmaker would otherwise take into account. Schauer, Rules, the Rule of
Law, and the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMM. 69, 83 (1989); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J.
509, 544 (1988).
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would have acted the same way but for the anticipated pressure that
his conduct would impose on shorts vulnerable to default.
At the end of the day, the factual issue may still be in substantial
doubt. This does not condemn the modified-sanctions approach, how-
ever. Uncertainty in the reconstruction of past events is what litiga-
tion is all about. Even the simplest rule of law may produce a victor
with a bare "preponderance of evidence" on its side.
Perhaps, though, Jerry Markham is correct in arguing that manip-
ulation will remain an "unprosecutable crime" so long as adjudicators
must determine after the fact just why the market price jumped, and
that it is better to rely on more comprehensive preventive regulation.5 9
I am reluctant to reach that conclusion, however, because, as Mark-
ham recognizes, such regulation carries its own costs.60 I prefer to
hope, until hope appears vain, that the apparent intractability in ma-
nipulation litigation does not inhere in the subject but results from a
failure to understand it. Asking the right questions, ones that accu-
rately describe the phenomenon at issue, will make the factfinder's
task easier, and in any event far more rational. A squeeze cannot be
described adequately by a checklist of criteria, as under the classical
approach. The essence of a squeeze is the exploitation of power over
the shorts, and the source of that power is the shorts' vulnerability to
the sanctions imposed for default.
59. Markham, supra note 1, at 88-90.
60. Id. at 89.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix examines the economics of an alleged futures squeeze,
showing how radically different accounts might explain extremely high
prices. To set the scene, it will help first to examine a market without futures
contracts. Assume that Long controls a large share of the supply of str-
ingbeans, that what constitutes the supply is unambiguous, and that Long has
no use for the beans except to sell them on this market. Assume also that no
other individual actor accounts for a significant share of the physical supply
or demand.
In Figure 1, line D represents the total industry demand at a given price.
The effective demand facing Long is less, however, for at any given price
small competitors will supply some beans. Line DL represents this effective
demand; the horizontal gap between D and DL indicates, for any given price,
the quantity that the small competitors will supply. Line MCL is Long's mar-
ginal cost curve. If Long acted like any of the other suppliers, producing
until his marginal cost equaled the market price, equilibrium would be
reached at the price and quantity indicated by point C: At price OA, Long
would produce the quantity AB and the small competitors would produce the
quantity BC, and consumers would demand just the total of those two
amounts, AC.
But Long will not act like the other suppliers, because he will realize that
increasing his production significantly will lower the price. Thus, for any
given output by Long, his marginal revenue, indicated by line MRL, is lower
than the market price. Long will produce until marginal revenue equals mar-
ginal cost. That will occur when he makes the quantity DE, which he can sell
at the price CD. At that price, the small competitors will supply the quantity
EF. And at that price, consumers will be willing to buy the entire industry's
output, DR.
Now we will alter the assumptions somewhat. First, assume that futures
are traded on this simple market and that Long has bought a very large long
futures position; we need not be concerned with how much he paid for the
contracts. 61 For simplicity, assume that Long is the only trader now holding
a long futures position and that - perhaps in anticipation of a likely run-up
in the price - no one else is now willing to go short. Finally, suppose that
prices have reached a level significantly higher than OD.
We will examine two polar-opposite scenarios that might lead to such a
price. Section A will look at Long's version, which places no importance on
the availability of futures trading and instead emphasizes Long's own use for
the physical product. Section B will examine the account of an aggressively
litigating party claiming that Long squeezed the market.
61. I do not mean to suggest that the intention with which, or the price at which, a trader
acquired his long position has no evidentiary significance in determining whether a squeeze oc-
curred. A long might, for instance, be able to argue with some force that he bought most of his
contracts at such elevated prices that an attempted squeeze would have been foolhardy, and that
only a genuine perceived need to own the commodity could explain his conduct. On the other
hand, if a trader has previously acquired a large long position, then increasing that position after
learning of market congestion might be considered evidence of manipulative intent. See note 16
supra.
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A. The Defendant's Account
Long will assert that, in driving the market to a price higher than OD, he
was acting like any other large-scale market actor. He may offer Figure 2 as
an accurate representation of what happened. This diagram does not reflect
the open futures interest in any way, for Long will contend that, at most,
futures trading provided a mechanism for facilitating ordinary transactions in
physicals. Rather, Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, but with a new marginal
cost curve, MCL'. For any given marginal cost, this curve indicates less out-
put than does MCL. The difference, Long may assert, reflects his own use for
the commodity; the lower the marginal cost, the more he can use. Thus,
MCL' represents a net marginal cost curve: For any given marginal cost,
MCL indicates the total amount Long can produce, the gap between MCL and
MCL' indicates his own use of the product, and MCL' indicates the net
amount he can make available to the market.
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Given this curve, Long's profit-maximizing conduct would lead to a price
of OK - considerably above OD - without his ever having thought of the
shorts or their vulnerability to sanctions. At that price small competitors
would supply LM to the market and Long would supply KL (equal to GH).
But Long would also produce HJ for his own use; GJ, the sum of GH and HJ,
is the most he could produce without raising his marginal cost, and at that
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Even much higher prices could be explained by a similar account; the
greater we assume Long's own use for the product is, the higher his profit-maximizing price is. Suppose that, even after using all he can produce at
marginal cost no higher than the market price, it is still worth Long's while to
pay that price for more. Long, in other words, may become a net demander
of the product. Figure 3 shows how this may occur. Here, Long's net margi-
nal cost curve is MC". Where this line extends to the left of the vertical axis,
it indicates that Long will want to be a net buyer. As MCL" is drawn, Long
has such great use for the beans that this will occur even at relatively high
prices. And of course at high prices, the small competitors will produce more
than other consumers want to buy. This suggests that equilibrium will be
reached at price OP. That price would result in small competitors producing
NQ with Long removing NP from the market and the balance, PQ, being sold
to other consumers. But, according to this account, at that price Long would
also find it worthwhile to produce PR for his own use, in addition to the
amount he bought.62 Standing for delivery on futures contracts, according to
Long, is merely the method by which he effectuates some of the purchases.
According to Long, high prices are explained by the ordinary forces of
supply and demand; he will argue that his own demand for the product con-
tributes upward price pressure, and he might acknowledge that his control of
a large portion of the supply does as well. But in his view, the vulnerability of
the shorts to default does not affect prices.
B. The Claimant's Account
The aggressively litigating claimant presents a far different view of how
the price and output results in either Figure 2 or 3 might be reached. She
argues that in fact Long has no use for the commodity except to sell it on this
market. Rather, she contends, the critical fact is that Long has a large long
futures position. This position corresponds to an equivalent short open inter-
est, which is indicated in Figure 4 by shifting the effective demand curve fac-
ing Long rightward by the amount of the open interest, to DL'. DL' is exactly
parallel to DL; this is because the shorts must avoid default by purchasing
physical supply or offsetting contracts, even if the price rises very high, and so
their demand is inelastic.
Long could sell at price OD, the price that maximized his profits before
futures trading was introduced to the market. At that price, consumers
would continue to buy DF and the small competitors to produce EF, leaving
Long to sell DE. The shorts would then effectively liquidate their contracts,
ES in quantity, at the market price, 0D.63 But Long is forgoing potential
62. The actual amounts and prices might be slightly different given these curves if Long,
recognizing that size gave him buying power, sought the intersection of MCL" with an extension
of MRL rather than that with DL. The essential analysis would not change; in any event, if
necessary Long could hypothesize another net marginal cost curve that would account for price
OP.
63. Most of the shorts would liquidate by offset at the market price. Some might actually
deliver, by procuring some of the physical supply that small competitors would otherwise have
sold to consumers. (Or in fact a short might be one of the small producers, and so use part of her
product for delivery rather than for sale to customers.) But then Long could take that delivered
product and sell it, at the same price, to the same consumers; the effect would be the same as if
the short had offset at the market price.
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profits if he does not press the price at least somewhat higher.
For example, suppose he picked a price of OK (the same price that Long
would explain with Figure 2). To do this, he would have to sell a much
smaller amount, KL: The higher price reduces consumers' demand to KM
and increases the small competitors' output to LM, thus leaving a much nar-
rower gap for Long to fill. But the shorts would still need effectively to offset
all their contracts, LT, at the market price. And because the market price is
now so much higher, this might be a profitable strategy for Long to pursue.
Indeed, he might well pursue it even further. If he pressed the price to
OU, the small competitors would supply just the amount that consumers
would buy. Thus, Long would supply no physical product to the market at
all, but he would still be able to liquidate his entire futures position at the
going price.
If Long lets price rise even higher than OU, the small competitors will be
eager to sell more than consumers will want to buy; thus, above price OU, D'
is left of the vertical axis. For example, suppose that Long lets the price rise
to OP. This is the price that would be explained in Long's account by Figure
3. According to Figure 4, as in Long's account, other suppliers will want to
sell NQ but consumers will only want to buy PQ. This means that Long can
maintain the price only by becoming a net buyer; although he is potentially a
low-cost supplier to the market, he must remove from the market quantity
NP supplied at high cost by others. He can do this by accepting delivery on
that quantity of futures contracts; the remainder, PV, will be liquidated at
price OP. That price may be high enough to make this strategy appealing. It
will not only reduce the number of contracts that Long offsets, however, but
it will also leave him with the problem of how to "bury the corpse" - that is,
how to dispose of the product on which he had to take delivery to maintain
price so high.64 And if Long is tempted to press price even higher, he must
realize that he can do so only by increasing the size of the corpse that requires
burial.
64. 3 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 5.27 at 53 (1987); T. Russo,
supra note 3, § 12.13.
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At just what price is Long's total profit maximized? The availability of
profits from the sale of futures contracts, which steadily increase until price
reaches OM, indicates that the profit-maximizing price must be at least
slightly higher than OD, which was Long's optimal price without taking
those profits into consideration. And the profit-maximizing price may even
be considerably higher than OU. Just where it will be depends on various
factors. Let us focus on four:
1. How Much Additional Product Can Others Supply at High Prices?
Imagine that the gap between D and DL narrowed - that is, for any given
price, the small competitors could supply less commodity than before. This
would mean that, as compared with the previous situation, more shorts
would offset and fewer would deliver in the face of a price rise. Thus, the less
supply other actors can provide, the more liquidation profits a price rise will
offer and the less intimidating a corpse it will threaten.
Of course, Long might have limited the ability of other suppliers to re-
spond to a price rise, and so increased his control over the market, by buying
up a substantial portion of their supply or productive capacity. Depending
on the size of Long's futures position, among other things, such purchases
might even be necessary if he is to have any hope of squeezing the market.
But possession by Long himself of a large amount of supply is not an absolute
precondition to a squeeze. Given a particular shape of D and DL, it may
matter relatively little how much physical supply Long controls beforehand,
or how cheaply he can produce it. Indeed, if the price rises above OU, Long
is a net buyer, and so he will not have to introduce any additional product to
the market at all.
2. How Much Product Will Buyers Demand at High Prices?
The more product that buyers are willing to purchase at a given price, the
less will be available for delivery against futures contracts. That means that
fewer of the shorts will deliver and more will liquidate - again yielding a
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smaller corpse and greater liquidation profits. The stronger the buyer de-
mand, therefore, the greater is Long's ability to control the market.
3. How Large a Futures Position Does Long Have?
If Long's futures position is tiny, then it will not offer him very much
opportunity to make litigation profits, and his total profits will be maximized
near OD, the price that maximizes his profits from the sale of physicals. If,
on the other hand, his futures position is enormous, then there are many
shorts whom he can exploit by driving price higher. His total profits will
therefore likely be maximized at a much higher point. In sum, the larger
Long's futures position, the greater is his incentive to drive the market to a
higher price.
4. How Valuable Is the Corpse?
If any product accepted by Long will be worthless to him - if, for exam-
ple, to keep the price high he may not attempt to sell the beans he has ac-
cepted until they spoil - his incentive to press prices higher will be
dampened. But perhaps the beans have some durable value to him; if so, he
will be more willing to accept the large deliveries that a high price will yield.
Suppose, for example, that Long can later unload whatever product he
accepts at the price that buyers would now pay for the total amount pro-
duced. 65 Under this assumption, and given the demand curves in Figure 4,
OP is Long's profit-maximizing price.66 This price results from a rather com-
plex calculation: The more Long withholds from the market now, the higher
65. The supposition is indicated in Figure 4n. If the actual price is OP, so that the total
amount produced is NQ, draw PWso that PW equals NQ in length. Drop a vertical line from W
to D. The intersection, at X, indicates the price, OY that consumers would pay for NQ. The










66. Long's profit is maximized when he maximizes his incremental net revenue (that is, profit
calculated without regard to the price he paid for his futures contracts, which is sunk cost). For
a price below OU, Long's incremental net revenue equals the market price times the sum of the
physical amount he sells and the outstanding futures interest, all less the cost to Long of produc-
ing the physical amount he sells. For a price greater than OM, his incremental net revenue
equals the value of the corpse plus the product of the market price and the amount of the short
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the price at which he will be able to offset futures contracts, but the fewer the
number of contracts he will be able to offset, the larger the corpse he will later
have to bury, and the lower the unit price he will be able to get for the corpse.
This analysis suggests that the squeezer makes a profit-maximizing calcu-
lation in the ordinary sense;67 the trouble is that a factor in the calculation is
the inelastic portion of the demand, not related to the economic value of the
commodity but rather driven by the shorts' need to satisfy their legal
obligations.
interest effectively offset at that price. If price is OP for example, the value of the corpse is the
area described in note 65 supra, and the amount of the short interest effectively offset is PV
67. This might not hold true for the trader who buys his futures position with the intent of
creating a squeeze. But, as argued in Part I of the text, such an early intent is not necessary for a
squeeze, cf supra notes 16, 61; the essence of the squeeze is the decision to retain one's position
as the contract nears expiration.
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